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LIVE ALIENATION: ONE SUPERPROMOTER ELIMINATES COMPETITION,
CONCERT FANS PAY THE PRICE, AND THE
SHERMAN ACT WAITS IN THE WINGS
LAURA

C.

HOWARD*

INTRODUCTION

On August 15, 1965, The Beatles played a concert in New
York City's Shea Stadium for 55,600 screaming devotees.1 It was
the "first-ever stadium rock concert." Fans were unable to hear
the group's thirty minute set over the din of the crowd due to the
stadium's ineffective PA system.' When Grand Funk Railroad
played the same venue in 1971, the band brought a sound system
that would reach the entire crowd.' As the popularity of largescale rock concerts grew, it became impractical for musical acts to
control all aspects of the performance and a new industry of local
promotion companies emerged to handle the logistics of concert
production.'
* J.D., May 2008, The John Marshall Law School.
1. TheRockRadio.com, Flashback: The Beatles Rock Shea Stadium,
http://www.therockradio.com/2005/08/flashback-beatles-rock-shea-stadium.
html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008)
2. Id.

3. NDTV.com, Bernstein Remembers the Beatles on 40th Anniversary,
http://www.ndtv.com/ent/musicnew/story ie.asp?section=Music&slug=Bernstei
n+remembers+The+Beatles+&id=3871 (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). See TONY
BRAMWELL WITH ROSEMARY KINGSLAND, MAGICAL MYSTERY TOURS: MY LIFE

WITH THE BEATLES 162-65 (Thomas Dunne Books 2005) (stating that the noise
from the crowd was so deafening that the Beatles had to re-record the set in
studio for national broadcast); see also BOB SPITZ, THE BEATLES: THE
BIOGRAPHY 578 (Little Brown 2005) (quoting John Lennon's comment
regarding the stage conditions that evening: "It was ridiculous! We couldn't
hear ourselves sing").
4. See Jim Beckerman, Grand Funk Railroad Spoke Volumes; So Did the
Band's Sound System, RECORD (Bergen County, New Jersey), Nov. 4, 2005, at
G19 (interviewing GFRR drummer Don Brewer who stated that while
conditions had improved, most stadiums across the country were not prepared
to handle a rock show, so the band chose to travel with its own PA system for
amplification).
5. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir.
2006). See also JOHN GLATT, RAGE & ROLL: BILL GRAHAM AND THE SELLING
OF ROCK 148 (Birch Lane Press 1993) (indicating that as rock and roll
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For the next thirty years, the industry was largely regional
and divided into territories.6
In 2000, Clear Channel Communications, Inc., a holding
company for the ownership of various media interests,7 including
radio and television stations, as well as fixed billboard
advertising,8 purchased a concert promotion company called SFX.9
SFX was a "corporate raider" that was buying up longstanding,
independent local promotion companies, 10 and producing more
than 26,000 events annually.11 Soon enough, Clear Channel was
"booking thousands of concerts a year."12 The "hands on" 3 local
promotion business had become a decidedly national industry. 4
This
Comment will examine
how Clear
Channel
Communications entered the boutique business of concert
promotion and nationalized the industry by virtue of its size and
control over various media outlets.1
The resultant national

emerged from a sub-culture and was embraced by mainstream America, the
number of promoters grew in response to the potential of huge financial gain).
6. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 85 (asserting that "slowly but surely the
American concert cake was carved up" by the concert promotion business); see
also id. at 209 (stating that in 1983, when Bill Graham sought to re-enter the
New York City promoter market, the New York Post wrote, "The rock and roll
scene is like the Mafia - everybody has his territory").
7. Nobody In Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc.
311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1056 (D. Colo. 2004).
8. G.R. Anderson Jr., Clear Channel Rules the World, CITYPAGES
(Minneapolis/St. Paul), Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.citypages.com/databank/26/
1263/article 12961.asp.
9. Id.
10. Id. SFX even purchased longstanding promotions giant Bill Graham
Presents.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 84 (interviewing Larry Magid, a young
promoter from The Electric Factory in the 1970's, who stated that local
promoters would paper the streets with posters, take phone calls, and sell
tickets to events from the office).
14. See Jim DeRogatis, Monster Deal Could Oust the Little Guy: Live
Nation's Acquisition of House of Blues Could Mean the Beginning of the End
for Independent Promoters, CHI.SUN-TIMES, July 16, 2006, at D6 (stating that
"Live Nation [SFX] set out to create a giant national monopoly, spending
billions of dollars buying up regional concert promoters"); see also Mark
Brown, Anschutz Entry Reignites Concert-Bookings Battle, DENVER ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 26, 2006, at 3D (maintaining that SFX was formerly a
number of independent promoters across the United States); Heerwagen, 435
F.3d at 223 (stating that when Clear Channel purchased SFX in 2000, the
company became the largest promoter and producer of live entertainment
events in the nation).
15. See Greg Kot, Will Live Nation Deal Give Concertgoers the Blues?, CHI.
TRIB., July 9, 2006, at 7 (stating that Clear Channel is the largest owner of
commercial radio stations in the United States and the "conglomerate has
effectively controlled the forums most valued by working musicians for
exposure: radio airplay and live performances"); DeRogatis, supra note 14, at
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market prevents independent promoters from competing
meaningfully in the trade, and concert fans are paying hugely
inflated prices to see shows. 6
Section I gives a brief history of the development of the
concert promotion industry and Clear Channel's entry into the
market. Section I also summarizes allegations against Clear
Channel of suspect activity that may come under the purview of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. Section II analyzes the litigation
surrounding this issue from the perspective of businesses
competing with Clear Channel.
Finally, Section III of this
Comment will scrutinize why no single producer suit alleging
monopolistic activities has ever been successfully concluded
against Clear Channel. Part III proposes that the argument must
be reframed from the perspective of individual end users (i.e.
concert fans) so that future proceedings may be triumphant in
terms of a Sherman Act claim.
I.

CONCERT PROMOTION: PAST AND PRESENT

A live concert is the result of negotiations between a concert
promoter and a booking agent or manager who represents an
artist." The booking agent sells the right to organize an event or
an entire tour to the promoter, who is responsible for overseeing
logistics, selling tickets to the public, and paying for the costs of
production associated with the show. 8

D6 (discussing an interview with Jerry Mickelson of Jam Productions in which
Mickelson laments Live Nation's purchase of the House of Blues chain).
Mickelson indicates that the elimination of another promotional competitor is
both bad for the consumer and the other companies in live entertainment. Id.
He posits that Clear Channel/Live Nation will be "only one company" soon. Id.
16. DeRogatis, supra note 14, at D6.
17. Heerwagen, 435 F.3d at 223; see also SPITZ, supra note 3, at 443
(exemplifying how Sid Bernstein negotiated with Brian Epstein for The
Beatles to play at Carnegie Hall in 1964); see also GLATT, supra note 5, at 99
(explaining that when a band wants to go out on tour, the manager hires a
booking agent who sells the services of the band to promoters for a fixed price).
18. Heerwagen, 435 F.3d at 223; see also GLATT, supra note 5, at 99
(explaining that the promoter assumed all risk for an event and was
responsible for all local production). After providing a guarantee to the act,
the promoter would have to buy sufficient newspaper and radio advertising to
sell seats. Id. The promoter would also have the responsibility of ticketing
the show, hiring the venue, and organizing security, medical services and
catering. Id.; see also BILL GRAHAM & ROBERT GREENFIELD, BILL GRAHAM
PRESENTS: MY LIFE INSIDE ROCK AND OUT, 296-99 (Doubleday 1992)

(illustrating that a promoter may take additional non-monetary risks when he
signs on for a particular event). While Bill Graham was not officially
associated with the Rolling Stones appearance at Altamont, where one person
was killed along with three accidental deaths, Graham did lend the services of
his crew for production. Id.
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A. A BriefHistory of Concert Promotion Before 2000
1.

Bill Graham:A True Frontiersman

Bill Graham transformed local concert promotion into a
formidable industry and has been called the "godfather" of modern
concert promotion.19 Graham's successful model"0 spurred the
formation of a number of promoterships throughout the country.21
In 1965, Graham set out to produce concerts and manage the San
Francisco Mime Troupe." Following his success with the Mime
Troupe, he operated the Fillmore Theatre in San Francisco,
attracting some of the strongest talent of the time.23
His
personable style and practical approach to the business allowed
him to become the top rock promoter in the industry.24
In December of 1990, the concert industry faced a slump
while the country's economy entered a severe recession." Graham
19. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 13-14 (discussing how Graham achieved
fame and fortune despite his humble beginnings as a "penniless refugee" by
"single-handedly turn[ing] rock 'n' roll concert promotion into big business").
20. Graham was known as a fierce competitor who managed to maintain a
high level of care for both the artists and attendees at his concerts. In an
interview with journalist Roger Trilling, Graham stated that his empire was
immune to the "attack of ambitious wanna-be promoters" because he
cultivated and nurtured his big name acts before they were household names.
GLATT, supra note 5, at 100-01. Graham was even willing to lose money in the
process because his loyalty to the band would ultimately be rewarded. See id.
at 149 (interviewing Michael Klefner, a dear friend of Graham's, who
indicated that the promotion style and business philosophy of Bill's company
"came from the street"). Bill was known for a personal business style that
included honesty and loyalty to friendship. Id. "If a guy was a straight
shooter, Bill was with you. If he wasn't, he was a shithead." Id.
21. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 149 (demonstrating how a young Chicago
promoter named Amy Granat looked to Bill Graham as a model for the
creation of Jam Productions, referring to Mr. Graham as "Mr. Music"); see also
id. at 160 (indicating that Arny Granat believed that Bill Graham Presents
could have taken over the national concert tour business during the 1970s, but
Bill chose not to because "he thought it was the wrong thing to do").
22. The liberal group of "colorful revolutionaries" performed for free in San
Francisco parks and had a strong following. GLATT, supra note 5, at 25.
Graham was invited to join the troupe as a promoter and business manager,
and he eventually insisted that "Bill Graham Presents" appear on the group's
handbills. Id. at 25-27. After he booked the Mime Troupe at a successful
multimedia dance event known as the Trips Festival, Graham sought to
cement his position in the San Francisco Music scene by setting up an official
organization and signed as the sole leaseholder of the Fillmore theatre in San
Francisco. Id. at 37-40.
23. See GRAHAM & GREENFIELD, supra note 18, at 165, 174, 199 (detailing
Graham's relationships with his more famous acts including Janis Joplin, The
Grateful Dead, and Jefferson Airplane).
24. Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 271-72 (describing how promoters were
"alarmed" by falling ticket sales, and Bill was forced to cancel a major summer
tour).
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blamed skyrocketing prices on the demands of artists, ticket
scalpers, and Ticketmaster surcharges." Graham recognized that
times were changing;" perhaps he had some insight into the
future. Unfortunately, Graham died in a tragic crash on October
25, 1991, when his helicopter became entwined in power lines near
Vallejo, California.28 Following his death, Bill Graham Presents
continued operations through its employees, but the organization
was fractured internally. 9
Eventually, SFX purchased Bill
Graham Presents, and in 2000, Clear Channel acquired SFX. °
2. Chicago's JAM Productions:Two Rogue PromotersFind
Success by Modeling Their Business on Bill Graham Presents
In 1971, as Bill Graham continued to rise to the top of the
promoter industry, Jerry Mickelson and Arny Granat met and
formed a promoter partnership in Chicago. After eight months of
working together and using an apartment as an office, they put on
their first show as JAM Productions: a sold-out Fleetwood Mac
concert. 31 Thirty-six years later, the company has staged more
than 15,000 events and in 2005, earned more than $107 million
according to Mickelson 2 The duo credits their success to forming
strong personal relationships with artists that withstood time, a
strategy perfected by Bill Graham in the 1970s.3
26. Bill Graham bemoaned the transformation of the "phenomena of rock 'n'
roll" and actively campaigned against rising ticket prices so people could

afford to attend concerts. Id. He urged artists to charge lower guarantees,
organized Californians Against Ticket Scalping, and testified before the
California Senate Judiciary Committee on April 30, 1991 against the charges
levied by Ticketmaster. Id.
27. Id. at 271.
28. Id. at 274.
29. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 277-78 (stating that the company had a
"business as usual" attitude following Graham's death, but top executives
were fighting for power and other executives were staging hostile takeovers).
30. Live Nation, History of BGP, http://bgp.com/history.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2008).
31. Matt Golosinski, All the World's a Stage for Entertainment Maven,
KELLOGG SCH. MGMT. NEWS, http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/news
/whatsnew/JamJerryM.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2008) (reporting Jerry
Mickelson's, co-founder of JAM Productions, speech at Northwestern
University Kellogg School of Management's Distinguished Entrepreneur
Speaker Series on January 17, 2006).
32. Id.
33. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 149 (stating that Arny Granat was a
"devoted student" of Graham's who gleaned from his mentor the strong
qualities required for success in the promoter business). "[Graham] was the
type of guy who always lived by the credo of not screwing or fucking in
business people who were friends. He always held to that 100 percent when it
came to us." Id.; see also Golosinski, supra note 31 (reporting Jerry
Mickelson's statement in a speech to the Kellogg School of Management that
the secret to JAM's success is working "hard to build and keep relationships
from the bottom up"). Mickelson indicated that JAM cultivates clients while
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JAM Productions is only one of the many promotion
companies that developed when rock 'n' roll hit the mainstream in
1972. 34 However, JAM is unique as one of the few independent
promoters that resisted a buy out when SFX sought to purchase as
many regional businesses as possible.35
B. Clear Channel's Vertical Leap
L. Lowry Mays founded Clear Channel Communications in
1972. He began by purchasing the local radio station KEEZ-FM in
San Antonio. 6 The company continued to buy fledgling radio
stations in various markets throughout the country, slowly
amassing a radio empire comprised of more than 1200 stations by
2000."7 While maintaining its radio empire, Clear Channel began
to make "vertical acquisitions" by purchasing other companies in
the "media/entertainment" supply chain." In 2000, Clear Channel
acquired promotions company SFX Entertainment for $4.4
billion.39 SFX was an organization that had already begun the
purchase and consolidation of regional concert promoters, and was
staging thousands of events per year." The merger between Clear
they are still struggling in local clubs and sees those relationships through to
future stardom. Id.
34. See GLATT, supra note 5, at 146 (commenting that in 1968, a record only
needed to sell 200,000-300,000 copies to be considered a best seller). Four
years later, lead artists were selling more than one million records. Id.
35. See DeRogatis, supra note 14, at D6 (quoting Gary Bongiovanni, editor
of the concert trade magazine Pollstar, who stated that Belkin sold in
Cleveland; Bill Graham sold in San Francisco; Delsener-Slater sold in New
York; and the Electric Factory sold in Philadelphia, yet JAM Productions
remained a solvent independent promoter).
36. Anderson, supra note 8.
37. See id. (detailing steps along Clear Channel's path to consolidation).
Clear Channel bought forty-nine radio stations in 1996, and the following year
it purchased seventy. Id. In 1998, Clear Channel spent $6.5 billion to buy
Jacor Communications, adding another 206 stations to its inventory. By
October 1999, the company added 830 stations when it acquired AMFM for
$24 billion (and quickly unloaded 100 stations to avoid antitrust issues). Id.
Clear Channel had become the leader in the industry. Its closest competitor,
Cumulus, was a far second, owning only 230 stations at the time. Id.
38. See id. (stating that Clear Channel's holdings began to include
television stations, concert venues, outdoor advertising, satellite services, high
speed internet services, trade publications and an advertising firm); see also
Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (indicating that after
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Clear Channel
Communications began acquiring broadcast and entertainment companies at
amazing speed).
39. Id.
40. See Carlye Adler, Backstage Brawl; In the FightNo One Else Wanted To
Take On, A Tiny Concert Promoter Is Defending Its Turf Against a Massive
Global Media Company. Is This Brave or Just Crazy?, FORTUNE SMALL Bus.,
Mar. 4, 2002, at 170 (asserting that the number of independent promoters
shrank from several dozen to less than ten because most companies merged
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Channel and SFX was hailed as a union that would "represent[] a
profound shift of power in the rock 'n' roll concert business."41
While Clear Channel CEO Lowry Mays described the union as a
means for the company to break into live entertainment because it
could take advantage of the "natural synergy between radio and
live music events,"" independent promoters watched their local
universe shrink from the front row."
Clear Channel christened the new acquisition Clear Channel
Entertainment and in December 2005, spun the live event arm of
the company into an independent and publicly traded company,
Beverly Hills based Live Nation." Today, Live Nation is the
nation's largest concert promoter controlling approximately 119
venues." The company reported more than $2.9 billion in sales in
2005.4
On July 6, 2005, Live Nation announced an agreement for the
purchase of the House of Blues Clubs and HOB Entertainment for
$350 million, with the merger to conclude before the end of the
year." The House of Blues Merger effectively knocked out Live
with SFX Entertainment during its consolidation period before Clear Channel

acquired SFX).
41. Mark Schapiro, The Day the Music Died, SALON, July 25, 2000,
http://archive.salon.com/business/feature/2000/07/25/sfx.
42. Clear Channel Closes SFX Deal, SPORTBUSINESS, Sept. 27, 2001,
http://sportbusiness.com/news/139115/clear-channel-closes-sfx-deal.
But see
Schapiro, supra note 41 (showing that the merger was not simply a marriage
of convenience). SFX had already successfully destroyed the "relationships
and loyalties" that made up the live entertainment business. Id. SFX's
production model assumed the roles of booking agent, promoter and radio
programmer, streamlining and making production a "one-stop" process. Id.
Clear Channel was not looking to cultivate a new business; it wanted to buy
pre-fabricated success. Id.
43. See Schapiro, supra note 41 (indicating that the new conglomerate
would be the "primary conduit through which Americans" would be exposed to
music trends). The Clear Channel behemoth would effectively squeeze out
competition because it would have a "near-lock" on the tools of promotion
including radio play and venues. Id.
44. DeRogatis, supra note 14, at D6; see also Bill Sloat, Fan Sues Media
Giant, Citing Cost of Concerts, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 3, 2006, at C1
(emphasizing Clear Channel's efforts to establish Live Nation as a separate
company in the midst of a Justice Department investigation for antitrust
allegations); but see Paul Egan, Concertgoers Sing the Blues Over High Ticket
Prices, DETROIT NEWS, June 9, 2006, at 1A (stating that Live Nation is a
distinct entity, separate from the Clear Channel umbrella; however, many
Clear Channel principals are a part of Live Nation's board of directors).
45. Brent Snavely, A Headline Act: Live Nation Works to Build Regional
ConcertProfile, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., June 5, 2006, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Kot, supra note 15, at 7.
See Live Nation to Purchase HOB
Entertainment, PROSOUND NEWS, July 6, 2006, http://prosoundnews.com/
articles/article_3968.shtml (noting that this may be the beginning of another
string of acquisitions). The announcement came immediately after Live
Nation purchased a controlling interest in the touring division of Michael
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Nation's closest competitor in the industry." With HOB out of the
picture, Live Nation has more discretion to expand or restrict the
artistic diversity in a regional music profile, as well as to
determine the range of local ticket prices.49
C. Suspicions that Clear Channel/Live Nation May Have Too
Much Control Over the Live EntertainmentMarket
Industry insiders, from artists down to ticket takers, began to
suspect that Clear Channel was running an illegal monopoly that
thwarted competition.50
Many listeners complained of the
homogeneous and repetitious radio programming that became a
national norm as a result of Clear Channel's market dominance.5
Some commentators find that Clear Channel's efforts to
consolidate radio have de-localized stations through the
implementation of prefabricated formats."
Others accuse the
company of "pay for play" practices in which stations are paid to
play the songs that they spin by the companies that manufacture
the records. 3 Some complaints even stem from artists who insist
that they have suffered decreased airplay on Clear Channel radio
stations because they failed to hire Clear Channel Entertainment
as the promoter for a concert tour.54 Perhaps the most vocal
Cohl's Concert Productions International. Id.
48. See Kot, supra note 15, at 7 (observing that the House of Blues Group is
Live Nation's closest competitor even though it only sold one quarter of the 29
million tickets sold by Live Nation in 2005).
49. Id.
50. Eric Boehlert, Suit: Clear Channel is an Illegal Monopoly, SALON, Aug.
8, 2001, http://archive.salon.com/entlclearschannel/2001/08/08/antitrust/index
.html. The article reports that, at this point, there was only a single
independent concert promoter from Denver who had come forward to confront
the multi-media giant with allegations of monopolistic, predatory and
anticompetitive practices. Id.
51. See Anderson, supra note 8 (stating that "[p]op music aficionados"
believe Clear Channel used general market research to create "repetitious,
lowest-common-denominator playlists around the country"). However, Clear
Channel's CEO insists that all market research is performed locally. Id.
52. See Todd Spencer, Radio Killed the Radio Star, SALON, Oct. 1, 2002,
http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2002/10/O1/nab/index.html (referring to
Clear Channel's streamlined practice of implementing similar formats in a
number of markets through stations such as KISS FM, Mix, and Alice as "the
McDonaldization of radio"). Spencer writes that these cost effective methods
of consolidation undermine the local character of radio to the point that people
are now listening to disc jockeys that are on tape and not even broadcasting
from the local region. Id.
53. See Eric Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON, Mar. 14, 2001,
http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/03/14/payola/index.html (illustrating
a modem version of "payola" in which independent record promoters ("indies")
serve as middlemen between the record company and the radio station, and
offer "promotional payments" to broadcasters for increasing the number of
spins for the represented artist).
54. See Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (alleging
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protestors are the fans themselves," objecting to an unnatural rise
in ticket prices.' Experts figure that the average price of a U.S.
concert ticket rose 82% between 1996 and 2003, a rate
exponentially faster than the inflation rate."7 Regardless of the
source of the grumblings, it is apparent that Clear Channel
manages a number of the resources that figure prominently in live
event production.'
D. The Sherman Act: FederalLegislation Designed to Control
Monopolies and Restraints of Trade
The Sherman Act of 1890 was the first piece of anti-monopoly

legislation passed to guarantee the federal government's ability to
regulate industry so there is no "collusion or dominance" of one
company in any given sector.9 The Sherman Act is based upon the

legislative premise that healthy competition within a given
product sector will yield the "best allocation of economic
resources."' However, while the Sherman Act protects notions of

that the number of radio "spins" for artist Puddle of Mudd decreased from
twenty-five per week to zero when the band confirmed a concert booking with
a local promoter as opposed to Clear Channel Entertainment); see also
Anderson, supra note 8 (urging that Clear Channel sometimes sets guarantees
for artists that a local promoter simply cannot match). Prominent artists Neil
Young and Steve Miller have begun to speak out about the Clear Channel
"squeeze" and Don Henley has testified before Congress insisting that Clear
Channel's booking operations are monopolistic practices. Id.
55. See Sloat, supra note 44 (recounting Daniel Woodring's efforts to sue
Clear Channel Communications for the use of coercive radio practices to
convince artists to use Live Nation as their concert promoter). Woodring
claims the result is ticket gouging in which people paid more to see "favored"
artists. Id.
56. See Heerwagen, 435 F.3d at 223-24 (detailing the plaintiffs allegations
that she paid inflated prices for concert tickets due to Clear Channel's
monopolistic activities).
57. Egan, supra note 44, at 1A; see also Sloat, supra note 44 (noting that
the Consumer Price Index that measures the rate of inflation in the U.S.
economy increased only thirteen percent between 1997 and 2002); Egan, supra
note 44, at 1A (providing an example comparing ticket prices in Clarkston,
Michigan where The Dave Matthews Band played at the DTE Energy Music
Theatre in June, 2006: pavilion seats sold for $60 while lawn seats cost $40).
These figures are significantly higher than the average $19 ticket price
charged by the band in 1995. Id.
58. See Anderson, supra note 8 (quoting Clay Steinmen, a media professor
at Macalester College, who stated "[t]hey've reached a point that's similar to
the prohibition on movie studios owning local theaters .... we don't want

people at one end of the production process controlling how that product gets
to people locally").
59. Id.
60. 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 21 (2006). The assumption presumes that
resources will be allocated efficiently, yielding the lowest product price with
higher quality, but will also preserve social ideals imbued in the customer. Id.
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vigorous competition, it does not "protect competitors."6 Federal
antitrust legislation seeks to protect the economic freedom of the
participants in a relevant market to the benefit of consumers, not
to their detriment.6 2 "To demonstrate an antitrust injury, the
plaintiffs must show that there is an injury to competition."
Whether there has been an injury to a competitor is irrelevant,
because the antitrust laws were enacted "for the protection of
competition, not competitors."'
While courts generally agree with this sentiment, they are
split as to what constitutes an antitrust injury.' Courts struggle
to determine if "injury to consumers is an essential ingredient of
liability"65 or if actual practices that restrict competition are the
true source of injury.66 The language of § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman

Act 7 is very broad,6 indicating that the 1890 legislature did not
61. Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of
Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (stating that "The law [The
Sherman Act] directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even
severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition
itself').
62. 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 23 (2006). The problem that the laws are
designed to combat is the "raw deal" consumers face when producers are not
engaged in meaningful competition with other forces, and the result is often a
lower service at an inflated price. Id.
63. Mich. State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 671 F.
Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
64. JamSports & Entm't, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. (JamSports1), 336
F. Supp. 2d 824, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
65. Id. (quoting dissent of Judge Easterbrook in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,
807 F.2d 520, 568 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile
Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Judge Posner's holding that if
no consumer interest can be discerned in a suit brought by a competitor, a
victory for that competitor confers no benefit on consumers, thus making the
application of antitrust legislation questionable).
66. See Fishman, 807 F.2d at 536 (stressing that the "antitrust laws are
concerned with the competitive process, and their application does not depend
in each particular case upon the ultimate demonstrable consumer effect"). "A
healthy and unimpaired competitive process is presumed to be in the
consumer interest." Id.
67. The Sherman Act §§ 1-2:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty: Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any
other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty: Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
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intend for the courts to construe the words literally, but to give the
scheme meaning according to the common law practice of resolving
issues on a case-by-case basis. 9 In an effort to give meaning to the
broad standards enunciated by the statute, many court decisions
have contradicted one another and the result is a jurisprudence
that seems ad hoc and almost arbitrary in nature."
Section 1 of the statute addresses bilateral activities that are
"Restraints of trade"
interpreted as "restraints of trade."7'
necessarily includes "restraints of competition" and courts often
interpret them to be one and the same." The statute outlaws
contracts between multiple actors" that have a monopolistic
tendency to eliminate competition, prevent future competition, or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
68. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386
(1956); see also MARKHAM, infra note 70 (stating that because the antitrust
statutes are couched in general language, they can have no practical meaning
until courts actually enforce them); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (stating that "[tihe prohibitions of the Sherman Act were
not stated in terms of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself does not
define them"). "In consequence of the vagueness of its language ... the courts
" Id.
have been left to give content to the statute ....
69. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating that in
antitrust litigation there is a need to adapt to changing commercial
circumstances and that it is the accepted view that Congress expected courts
to shape the meaning of the statute's broad terms by drawing on common law
tradition).
70. See WILLIAM A. MARKHAM, AN OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW (2000),

http://www.maldonadomarkham.com/Antitrust-Law-San-Diego.htm
(questioning whether the law is supposed to be understood to prohibit specific
conduct or if its application is "unpredictable, unknowable, seemingly
arbitrary, and therefore disruptive?"). Markham continues to opine that,
"[slome courts have been disposed to find antitrust violations in every corner,
while others have refused to see it in even the most brazen instances of
predatory exclusions and anticompetitive conspiracies." Id.
71. 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 26 (2006); see also LOUIS ALTMAN, 1 CALLMANN
ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:21 (4th ed. 2006)

(stating that § l's broad prohibition of "restraint of trade" can only be violated
by meeting the restrictive requirement of collective action).
72. Mich. State PodiatryAss'n, 671 F. Supp. at 1151.
73. See JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
A PRIMER 16 (AEI Press 2001) (stating that without collective action, even if
certain conduct puts a restraint on trade, § 1 is not applicable); see also
Answers.com, Sherman Antitrust Act, http://www.answers.com/topic/shermanantitrust-act (last visited Apr. 27, 2008) (articulating that § 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits concerted action, requiring "more than a unilateral act by a
person or business alone" in restraint of trade).
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control7 4the resources that competition relies upon for its own
output.
However, in keeping with legislative intent, courts interpret
the statute in light of changing conditions." Although the text of
the statute makes illegal any "combination ... in restraint of
trade,"" the Supreme Court ruled long ago that the statute only
applied to restraints that are "unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions."
The Supreme Court has deemed four
categories of conduct per se illegal under § 1: price fixing,
territorial allocations of the market, group boycotts, and tying
arrangements." When courts consider what is "unreasonable" for
other types of activity and arrangements, they do not employ a
bright line test; instead they apply the "rule of reason."79 When
evaluating conduct in terms of § 1, the "rule of reason" urges that
a court weigh the relevant circumstances to decide whether the

74. Id. The statute makes illegal any means that would restrain interstate
commerce, including "unlawful contracts, trusts, pooling arrangements, black
lists, boycotts, coercion, threats, [and] intimidation." Gompers v. Buck's Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438 (1911) (citing Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908)).
75. See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 513 (4th
Cir. 2002) (showing how the court manages the statute in light of specific
facts). When geographic and physical limitations required coordination among
competitors, the court applied the Sherman Act requirements with flexibility.
Id.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
77. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); see also
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 16 (stating that if read literally, the
text of § 1 would prohibit all contracts having an incidental or secondary effect
of restraining trade "regardless of the effect on competition or economic
welfare"). The author states that all contracts have some effect on trade
because they effectively remove one buyer and seller from the market during
that time. Id. The Supreme Court articulated the "unreasonable" rule of
Standard Oil to circumvent the problem so that every contract would not be
subject to Sherman scrutiny. Id.
78. RICHARD M. CALKINS, ANTITRUST: GUIDELINES FOR THE BUSINESS

EXECUTIVE 57 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1981). In explaining the per se doctrine of
liability under § 1 of the Act, Justice Black wrote that:
[There] are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use .

..

. Among the practices which the courts

have heretofore deemed to be unlawful ... are price fixing, United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210; division of markets,
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211; group
boycotts, Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade
Commission, 312 U.S. 457; and tying arrangements, International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392.
Id. at 57-58.
79. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 17.
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conduct under scrutiny tips the balance toward being procompetitive or anticompetitive (unreasonable). °
Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on unilateral or
monopolistic practices that create barriers to entry for other8 1
competitors in the area of interstate, foreign trade, or commerce.
The language of the statute dubs the offense "monopoliz[ation]"83
and "attempts to monopolize"" as opposed to "monopoly."
Natural monopolies that develop as a result of efficiency are not
subject to the legislation,' only behavior that is systematically
designed to harm competitors and consumers in an effort to
achieve a monopoly or maintain a monopoly is subject to § 2.5
Therefore, the offense of "monopolization" has two distinct
elements: first, there must be possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market, and second, there must be willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power." In determining whether a company
80. See id. (articulating that the rule of reason subjects suspect conduct to
evaluation in terms of market circumstances by assessing the extent of
market power that one party possesses and the substantial effect on its
competition (injury to competition) or whether the alleged restraint will
restrict output and raise prices (injury to the consumer)).
81. Lee C. Van Orsdel, Antitrust Issues in Scholarly and Legal Publishing:
Report on an Invitational Symposium in Washington D.C., 66 C&RL NEWS,
May 2005, available at http://www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlpubs/crlnews/back
issues2005/may05/antitrust.cfm; see ALTMAN, supra note 71, at § 4:21 (stating
that the test for monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act does not require
collective behavior and a single actor as a monopoly may be a threat to
competition itself); see also 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies § 53 (2006) (indicating
that § 2 does not have a contractual element and governs the conduct of single
actors, making unilateral monopolization a violation of the Sherman Act); see
also 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 28 (2006) (articulating that § 2 of the Act is used to
reach actions and conduct that bring about the forbidden end of
monopolization).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
83. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 19 (averring that abusive
conduct as opposed to sheer size of a monopolist, such as exclusionary or
predatory conduct to gain monopoly status, is subject to antitrust
enforcement); see also 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 32 (2006) (stating that an actor
with a monopoly can engage in a competitive course of conduct for valid
business reasons rather than as a means to stifle competition); see also 58
C.J.S. Monopolies § 28 (2006) (stating that the prohibition is aimed at the
acquisition or retention of effective market control, not natural market
trends).
84. See id. (stating that a high market share that results from natural
forces is unobjectionable in terms of the statute); see also Fishman, 807 F.2d at
537-38 (finding that monopolies do not injure the competitive process as long
as the winner of the natural monopoly competes freely and the process is not
short-circuited in its acquisition of the monopoly).
85. Id.

86. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies § 53 (2006); see also Commercial Data
Servers, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 262 F. Supp. 2d 50, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(stating that in order to establish monopolization there must be a willful
acquisition of monopoly power as opposed to growth that is a consequence of
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willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power, it is necessary to
consider whether the acts complained of unreasonably restricted
competition rather than harmed individual competitors.87
A complaint alleging an attempt to monopolize must also
carry the element of specific intent to monopolize as well as a
dangerous probability of success in monopolizing the relevant
product market.'
However, in proving the violation, it is not
necessary for the actor to have already achieved a monopoly, only
that it has sufficient market power to accomplish the objective.8 9
Any contention that Clear Channel is a monopoly engaging in
activity that unreasonably restricts competition would be subject
to scrutiny under § 2 of the Sherman Act.9" In order to be
successful with any such claim, a plaintiff must establish that
Clear Channel engages in anticompetitive, predatory, or
exclusionary behavior in the course of acquiring, maintaining, and
extending its monopoly power (or attempting to do so) in a
relevant product and geographic market.91
E. Accusations and the Sherman Act
The first claims of Clear Channel's monopolistic behavior
were filed by members of the live entertainment industry, citing
violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act to little avail. In 2001,
"superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"); see also 54 AM. JUR.
2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 487 (2006) (stating that the proof
required to show the completed offense of monopolization requires evidence of
a generalized intent to monopolize, whereas attempted monopolization
requires a specific intent to acquire the monopoly).
87. See Christofferson Dairy, Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F. 2d 1168, 1174
(9th Cir. 1988) (arguing that predatory and anticompetitive practices are
actions that harm the competitive process by obstructing competition's basic
goals of lower prices, better products, and more efficient production methods);
see also Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC., 284 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 2002)
(showing that evidence of higher prices in the absence of demonstrating
anticompetitive practices is not enough to satisfy § 2 of the Sherman Act).
88. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraintsof Trade § 487 (2006).
89. See id. (outlining that a complaint for "attempted monopolization" must
contain allegations specifying the market in which the defendant has
attempted to create a monopoly, as well as the offender's economic prowess in
that market).
90. There is an argument beyond the scope of this Comment postulating
that Clear Channel alone may be subject to claims of violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. See Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1069
(indicating that there may be a conclusion that a holding company can direct
and mandate the anticompetitive conduct of its subsidiaries and thus be
subject to the bilateral (contract) requirements of § 1 of the Sherman Act). But
see Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984)
(providing dicta that "[a]ny anticompetitive activities of corporations and their
wholly owned subsidiaries meriting antitrust remedies may be policed
adequately without resort to an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine ...the
enterprise is fully subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act") (emphasis added).
91. Nobody In ParticularPresents,311 F. Supp. 2d at 1096-97.
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Nobody In Particular Presents (NIPP), a Denver independent
concert promoter, filed an antitrust lawsuit in a Denver federal
court charging Clear Channel with anticompetitive practices. 9
NIPP accused Clear Channel of using airplay control to coerce
artists in concert promotions decisions93 and refusing promotional
support on the radio for NIPP concerts.94
A few years later, in 2004, JamSports & Entertainment, LLC
filed an antitrust suit against Clear Channel stating that the
company violated § 2 of the Sherman Act when it sought to
interfere with a contract that JamSports possessed for the
promotion of the American Motorcyclist Association (AMA)
Supercross Series from 2003 to 2009."5 A letter of intent between
JamSports and the AMA gave JamSports ninety days of exclusive
negotiating rights for the series.96 Clear Channel contacted the
AMA during this time to present its own proposal.97 JamSports
alleged that Clear Channel's methods of obtaining the contract,
and pressuring venues to deny JamSports access for supercross

92. Boehlert, supra note 50. NIPP presented testimony and internal Clear
Channel e-mails showing that the company had refused airplay on its Denver
radio stations for artists and labels who had booked shows with promoters
other than Clear Channel Entertainment. Id. Jason Martin, a representative
of Roadrunner Records, testified that the director of programming at a Denver
Clear Channel station threatened to pull promotional support for the "Tattoo
the Earth Tour" because Roadrunner had hired NIPP as its promoter. Nobody
In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
93. Id. at 1061. NIPP alleged rock artists were afraid that if they failed to
book their concert tour with SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment, Clear
Channel Radio Stations would reduce or refuse those artists' airplay. Id.
NIPP cited testimony and messages from former Clear Channel employees
and record label owners to support its position. Id.
94. Id. at 1063. NIPP argued that it was customary for local concert
promoters to have contact with radio program directors, and the stations
would usually give free promotional support in the form of ticket giveaways
and on-air mentions for concerts that were musically similar to the format of
the given station. Id. NIPP claimed that Clear Channel stations gave
preferential treatment to its own concert promotion business. Id. NIPP
supported its allegations with a copy of an e-mail message sent from Clear
Channel to all radio program, promotions and music directors at Denver Clear
Channel rock stations that prohibited providing on-air support to promoters
other than SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment unless the promoter bought
commercial time with the station. Id.
95. JamSports & Entm't, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. 336 F. Supp. 2d 824
(N.D. Ill. 2004).
96. Id. at 828.
97. Id. at 830.
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events, 98 constituted anticompetitive conduct in violation of the
Act. 99
Unfortunately, although Clear Channel's practices directly
affected NIPP and JamSports's ability to compete effectively in the
live event industry, no definitive ruling was ever issued with
regard to Clear Channel's practices and the Sherman Act. The
independent concert promoters were unable to continue to pursue
protracted litigation, perhaps because of the day-to-day demands
of their businesses, and settled with Clear Channel for undisclosed
amounts, 0

II. APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT:
A PERPLEXING CONUNDRUM
A. Competing Interpretationsof Antitrust Legislation
It is difficult to assign meaning to the language of the
Sherman Act because its interpretation.. by courts and scholars
provides some trends, but no unanimous translation.'
Generally,
the Act is a set of rules designed to preserve the competitive
process and maintain the integrity of the markets, making it
unnecessary for the government to interfere directly in business
affairs.' °3

98. See id. at 844 (showing that Clear Channel took a "threatening posture"
in emails to the manager of the Astrodome and Reliant Parks, two traditional
supercross venues, when Clear Channel threatened to cease production of
future shows in either venue if the parks booked a JamSports event).
99. Id. at 827.
100. See infra notes 157 and 179 and accompanying text (discussing
settlements Clear Channel reached with both NIPP and JamSports).
101. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 9 (stating that the
meaning of the statute was not entirely clear because the framers failed to
include a detailed list of prohibited activities in favor of a "generalized statute
of constitutional breadth"); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (pointing out

that while the federal antitrust statutes are easily "readable" on their face, the
operative terms such as "monopolize" and "restraint of trade" are "opaque").
102. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 11. An understanding of the
goals of antitrust legislation "appears to depend on which antitrust statue is
being analyzed, by whom, and for what purpose." Id.
103. See id. at 1-2 (asserting that preserving the competitive health of
markets makes it unnecessary for government to make specific decisions
regarding what should be produced, who should produce it and who should
have access to the necessary materials). In essence, the laws safeguard ideals
of free enterprise and only allow government interference when competition is
compromised and the market fails. Id. The central notion that competition is
worthy of protection is an ideal that is accepted by all "regardless of political
party or school of economic thought." Id. at 10.
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Economic Efficiency and the Market

One school of thought urges that courts distinguish between
the behavior of monopolizing companies and those actors who are
simply competing vigorously."° Judge Richard A. Posner, while a
professor of economics at the University of Chicago, postulated
that economic efficiency 5 is the ultimate goal of antitrust
enforcement,"6 and there is no justification for applying antitrust
enforcement to areas that are simply strongly competitive and not
Inefficiency happens when competition is
inefficient."°7
compromised by synthetic forces made up of exclusionary or
anticompetitive conduct.0 8 Posner and those who share his views
believe the concentration of production in the hands of one or a few
actors bolsters economic efficiency as long as competition remains
Ultimately, the purely economic objective of
hale and hearty."
antitrust legislation as advanced by the "Chicago School" enhances
consumer welfare in the form of competitive pricing through the
efficient allocation of resources with optimal output.1 0 According
to court decisions that echo these tenets, the Sherman Act should
provide consequences for violations when consumer welfare is
demonstrably injured.1
2. Market Diversity and Opportunity
There are a number of sociopolitical objections to the
efficiency argument, which posit that conduct undermining the
tools of competition can trigger an antitrust violation in the
104. See POSNER, supra note 101, at 4 (arguing that economic theory

provides a basis for the belief that monopoly pricing (creating an artificial
scarcity of a product, thus driving its price up more than would happen under

healthy competition) is inefficient and subject to antitrust scrutiny).
105. Economic efficiency has been defined as "[t]he extent to which a given
set of resources is being allocated across uses or activities in a manner that
maximizes whatever value they are intended to produce, such as output,
market value, or utility." Deardorfis Glossary of International Economics,
http://www-personal.umich.edu/-alandear/glossary/e.html (last visited Apr.
27, 2008).
106. POSNER, supra note 101, at 4.
107. See id. (insisting that it is improper to use antitrust enforcement to
promote goals other than economic efficiency, "such as promoting a society of
small trades people").
108. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 11 (stating that the
Sherman Act proscribing monopolizing behavior reflects the economic
objective of enhancing consumer welfares by preventing practices that reduce
competition).
109. See POSNER, supra note 101, at 22 (maintaining that "whenever a
monopoly would increase efficiency, it should be tolerated").
110. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 11.
111. See JamSports I, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (stating that several Seventh
Circuit decisions authored by Judge Easterbrook adopt a definition of
antitrust injury requiring the plaintiff to show that the loss comes from acts
that "reduce output or raise prices to consumers").
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absence of or in addition to consumer injury."' These arguments
advance the notion that the antitrust laws aim at protecting
varying societal concerns beyond the pure belief in economic
efficiency."'
First, there is the notion that monopoly transfers wealth from
consumers to the stockholders of monopolistic firms."' Second,
there is speculation that monopolies, or the concentration of a
market in the hand of a few, will lead to a strong influence on the
political process for laws aimed at protecting the industry.15
Finally, there is a popular notion that antitrust legislation should
restrict the freedom of large businesses in favor of promoting the
interests of small businesses."6 Producer welfare, rather than
consumer welfare, is now being emphasized by some proponents as
fundamentally fair in our economic framework.' 7 Others argue
that the market society is built upon the framework of "individual
enterprise" and there must be diverse power in the private sector
and maximum opportunity for personal endeavors.'
3. Antitrust Philosophiesand Clear Channel ConcertPromotion
A careful examination of the litigation involving Clear
Channel Entertainment (Live Nation) and the Sherman Act is
necessary in order to grasp how the "confusing and often
conflicting objectives [of antitrust legislation]"" 9 apply in practice
to alleged anticompetitive practices in concert promotion. This
Comment will isolate the social and economic values embraced by
each court in an effort to determine if Clear Channel's activities
fall within the purview of the Act, or if the company is simply
engaging in lively competition. Generally, courts focus on the
economic goal of the legislation, but the philosophical and social
subtext of the antitrust laws requires that they be sensitive to the
non-economic goals as well.12'

112. POSNER, supra note 101, at 18.
113. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 12 (advancing the belief
that there are factors in addition to consumer welfare that cannot be ignored
in light of the enforcement of antitrust laws).
114. POSNER, supra note 101, at 18.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 19. In fact, some of the antitrust statues were motivated by a
purpose to protect the "Jeffersonian model of small dealers and competitors,
notwithstanding some possible costs to society in terms of reduced efficiency."
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 11.
117. See POSNER, supra note 101, at 12 (asking why consumers should be
favored over producers in terms of antitrust enforcement).
118. Id.
119. Id. Courts are faced with reconciling the social goals of antitrust policy
(dispersed power and individual opportunity) and its economic objectives
(consumer welfare and efficiency). Id.
120. Id. at 14.
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B. Nobody in ParticularPresents:A Court Acknowledging the
Importance of Consumer Welfare But Intimating That Producer
Interest May Be Relevant to the Inquiry
United States District Judge Edward W. Nottingham issued a
seventy-three page opinion giving a detailed analysis of NIPP's
Sherman Act claims against Clear Channel Communications, the
party moving for summary judgment on all claims.12 ' As Judge
Nottingham scrutinized the grievance, he provided a detailed
breakdown of the elements of an antitrust violation. 12
Without
deciding the case on its merits, Nottingham made a painstaking
record of the injury that NIPP claimed to have suffered. While not
obvious, it seems that the opinion meant to illustrate that, in
addition to economic efficiency, this court was concerned with a
number of alternative factors regarding the overall13 health of the
competitive process of concert promotion in Denver.
1. Defining the Relevant Market
The first step to analyzing an antitrust claim is determining
the relevant product and geographic market in which the
defendant operates.124 Generally, the relevant market consists of
all goods that consumers view as realistic substitutes for one
another.
In analyzing the market, Judge Nottingham
determined that the relevant market for the § 2 claims was the
market for live music concerts where the seller is the music
concert promoter and the buyer is the concert-going public. 2 6 He
121. Nobody in Particular Presents Inc., v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc.
311 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Colo. 2004).

122. See generally id. (establishing a framework for the antitrust claims of
monopolization and attempted monopolization, with each claim divided into
its individual elements including the court's reasoning for resolving each
portion of the argument).
123. The court examined evidence that Clear Channel prevented competitors
from entering the market through its influence over the rock radio market and
promotion, and only mentioned consumer welfare once when detailing Clear
Channel's practice of charging prices that are above average. Nobody In
ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
124. Telecor Commc'ns Inc. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1130 (10th
Cir. 2002); see also 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 56
(2006) (indicating that the relevant market must be shown because a charge of
monopolization in violation of § 2 demands a showing of monopoly power or an
attempt to monopolize; it is impossible to determine the presence of a
monopoly without a specific delineation of the market); see also SHENEFIELD &
STELZER, supra note 73, at 31 (charging that the aim of market definition is to
determine what competitors may be engaged in a "competitive battle" given a
specific product within certain geographic boundaries).
125. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 31 (stating that not only
does a relevant market include identical substitutes but also products that
consumers may readily switch).
126. See Nobody in ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp 2d at 1076 (noting that
antitrust laws apply to restraints on input markets as well as output
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argued that a jury could reasonably find that the output market
(tickets) is the relevant market, and would thus require an
analysis of the input markets that Clear Channel controls to
NIPP's detriment.1 7 He believed that in order to evaluate the
anticompetitive nature of Clear Channel's conduct, the court
should analyze consumer injury in terms of producer injury
(control over input streams). 18 Judge Nottingham's discussion of a
relevant market definition indicated that the relevant consumer
was not necessarily the end user of the product, but a court could
also define it in terms of the "level of commerce [alffected by the
defendant's behavior.""9 Nottingham went so far as to quote
Telecor Communications Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
in which the court stated that "[the] Sherman Act does not confine
its protection to consumers ... [the] Act is comprehensive in its
terms and coverage, 30protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices."
2. Monopolization
Nottingham's
opinion continues
by
examining
the
monopolization claim.13 1 In order to prove monopolization, it is
necessary for a plaintiff to show the defendant's possession of

markets); see also id. at 1083 (stating that NIPP set forth evidence, through
its expert witness and economist, Dr. Phillips, of the "practical indicia
necessary to define the relevant market as tickets for rock concerts"). Based
on Dr. Phillips's testimony, rock concerts have distinct qualities from other
concerts, including unique sources of advertising and promotional input (rock
radio). Id.; see also id. at 1075 (stating that there was no need to investigate
the geographic scope because the parties had stipulated to the region: the
Denver area).
127. See id. at 1077-78 (claiming that Clear Channel's behavior under these
circumstances is asserted to affect multiple input markets (the market for
promotional services, radio airplay, advertising and promotional support) in
addition to the downstream output market).
128. Id. at 1078. The court continues to posit that even if Clear Channel's
conduct did not show injury to competition in each separate input category,
the company's comprehensive conduct in all of the input markets may "injure
competition in the downstream market collectively." Id.
129. See id. at 1076 (demonstrating that in Telecor, Southwestern Bell and
Telecor competed for pay-telephone locations and therefore the relevant
consumers for purposes of market definition were the owners of the location,
not those end-users of telephones). "The Supreme Court has ... held that
antitrust laws apply not only to restraints on output markets but to input
markets as well, including both labor and input commodities.. .. " Id. (citing
Telecor, 305 F.3d at 1135).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1098 (stating that "NIPP allege[d] that Clear Channel...
monopolized the market for rock-concert tickets in the Denver metropolitan
area by engaging in anticompetitive conduct such as predatory pricing, tying,
and preventing its competitors from using radio for promotions").
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monopoly power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition
of that power."'
a.

Monopoly Power

A court may deduce that monopoly power exists by analyzing
an actor's control of the dominant share of the relevant market
coupled with the actor's protection of that share via entrance
barriers.133 In this case, Nottingham acknowledged that NIPP
provided evidence that Clear Channel charged "super competitive
prices" and "excluded competition"" by blocking access to certain
necessary input markets,'35 but failed to assert that Clear
Channel's market share was sufficient to constitute a monopoly
power.'36 It appeared that Judge Nottingham was hinting that the
second element of the charge may have been fulfilled but the
market share was too disparately low to pursue the claim. 37 After
determining that the company did not possess a monopoly in the
relevant market, there was no need for the court to address the

132. Id. at 1098; see also SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 37
(reminding that monopoly power is only a threshold requirement of § 2 of the

Sherman Act and is not in and of itself illegal). Antitrust laws do not prohibit
fierce, even cut-throat competition, and competitors should not be punished for
fairly winning a market. Id.
133. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see
also SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 42 (urging that while a
company may achieve monopoly status through purely lawful means, it cannot
raise barriers to entry by other competitors unless it has a justification based
upon efficiency).
134. Nobody In ParticularPresents,311 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
135. See id. (listing the various inputs that Clear Channel allegedly
controlled, blocking access from competitors including: artists, rock radio
airplay and rock radio promotional support).
136. See id. (indicating that the 50.48% market share that Clear Channel
allegedly possessed was impressive but not enough to be considered
monopolistic). The court recognized that the Supreme Court has not given a
minimum indicator as to what percentage of market power constitutes a
monopoly, however lower courts generally look for a minimum market share
between 70 and 80%. Id.; see also SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at
36-37 (showing that a firm may have less than 100% of market share to
demonstrate market power, but the definition of "market power" was
historically (though by no means concretely) based upon a "short hand
indicator" that a single firm with 75 to 80% or more of a relevant market
would be deemed a monopoly).
137. Once again the judge is hinting that restricted input markets (rock
promotional services and rock radio play) create a supply side barrier to entry
for other promoters and may be worthy of the protection of antitrust
legislation in addition to consumer welfare. Nobody In ParticularPresents,
311 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. Judge Nottingham continues by stating that,
"[a]llegedly, this single competitor has increased the cost for these inputs to a
point where no competitor could enter the market for rock concert tickets and
provide tickets at lower prices than the competitor who has control of the cost
of these inputs." Id. at 1085.
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"willful" element of the claim. The court ultimately granted Clear
Channel's motion for summary judgment on the claim of
monopolization. 38
3. Attempted Monopolization
NIPP also accused Clear Channel of "attempted
monopolization" under § 2 of the Sherman Act. The four elements
needed to prove an attempt to monopolize are: 1) relevant
market, 39 2) dangerous probability of success in monopolizing the
relevant market, 3) specific 1intent
to monopolize, and 4) conduct in
40
furtherance of such attempt.
a.

The Dangerous Probability of Success

In assessing the dangerous probability of success in terms of
Clear Channel's alleged exclusionary conduct, Judge Nottingham
considered a number of factors. First, he contemplated Clear
Channel's ability to control prices 4' or exclude competition. 42
Nottingham determined that NIPP provided sufficient evidence
that Clear Channel charged prices above the competitive level."
He also found that NIPP effectively demonstrated that Clear
Channel's control of the Denver rock radio industry limited other
promoters' access to artists and promotional support.'
Nottingham also evaluated probability in terms of Clear
Channel's market share and determined that NIPP set forth
evidence that Clear Channel holds a 50.48% share of the market
for rock concerts, indicating that the company has "substantial
138. Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
139. NIPP already put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
relevant market is for rock tickets. Id.
140. Id. In essence,'even if a firm has not achieved an actual monopoly, if
the court finds a "dangerous probability" that there is a plan to reach a
monopoly by restricting competition, the claim for attempted monopolization
will succeed. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 38.
141. Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. One must
make a finding that the defendant can continually control prices as a sign of
the market power necessary for attempted monopolization. Id.
142. Id. When one actor has the ability to exclude competition he may
necessarily control output, because other firms have no access to the necessary
inputs needed to increase output. Id. at 1101.
143. Id. at 1099. The ability to raise prices above the average in the
industry while simultaneously increasing one's market share is evidence of a
potential ability to control prices. Id. Using expert opinion and data from
Pollstar magazine, NIPP presented evidence that in 2000, NIPP charged an
average $13.32 per concert ticket while SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment
averaged $33.69. Id. at 1065. As Clear Channel acquired a larger market
share of the Denver concert region between 2000 and 2001, the average price
for a rock concert ticket rose 3.7%. NIPP increased its ticket prices consistent
with that average while the mean cost of SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment
concert admission jumped 23.5% to $41.59 per ticket. Id.
144. Id. at 1102.
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economic power" in the market and could elevate that status to
monopolistic levels. 4 ' He examined Clear Channel's resources and
concluded that the company's financial strength and "multimarket domination" supported NIPP's claim for attempted
Nottingham also indicated that market trends
monopolization.'
-may lead to a probability of success in monopolization because
Clear Channel's market share grew rapidly in a short period of
time, while its competitors' market share decreased, making
probability a potential reality.'47
NIPP also put forth a showing that there were significant
barriers to market entry in the Denver area in support of its claim
of attempted monopolization.'48 The court ultimately concluded
that NIPP satisfied its burden on summary judgment to show
Clear Channel's probability of success in monopolization.149
b.

Specific Intent to Monopolize

The court then addressed the element of the specific intent to
monopolize."'
According to Judge Nottingham, intent is
necessarily derived from exclusionary behavior and NIPP
presented evidence that constituted improper exclusion.
145. Id. A market share of 41% is sufficient to show "substantial economic
power." Id.
146. Id. at 1103. Showing that Clear Channel's competitors have a fraction
of the financial strength and diversity because none own rock radio stations,
further hindering access to necessary inputs (artist airplay and radio
advertising) and making the probability of success of monopolization all that
more likely. Id.
147. Id. NIPP presented evidence that Clear Channel's share of the market
skyrocketed in Denver from .45% in 1999 to 50.48% in 2001, while NIPP's
market share shrunk. Id.
1
148. Id. at 1004. Those listed barriers included: Clear Channels ownership
of radio stations and consequent access to promotional support, relationships
with rock artists, Clear Channel's ownership of venues in Denver, Clear
Channel's national presence, and Clear Channel's significant working capital.
The court reinforced that it would be difficult for any competitive promoter to
also own and operate a radio station because it would be cost prohibitive as a
means of running a promotion company. Id. at 1103.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1105. The requisite intent may be revealed by direct evidence
(the proverbial smoking gun, such as a document outlining a plan to do
"whatever it takes to take over a market") or it may be established by indirect
evidence in the form of improper conduct often described as "predatory,
exclusionary or otherwise anticompetitive." SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra
note 73, at 39. Improper conduct may be identified in that it "is not rational
from a business point of view but for its tendency to harm a competitor or
undermine competition." Id. at 40.
151. Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. Electronic
messages between executives and Clear Channel radio programmers indicated
that Clear Channel had the specific intent to exclude promoters from access to
radio promotional support and advertising even though such support could
have been financially beneficial to those radio stations. Id. For example,
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Anticompetitive Conduct

The final element of an attempted monopolization claim 1is52
proof that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct.
Anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct is "conduct constituting
an abnormal response to market opportunities." 53
Judge
Nottingham determined that evidence of Clear Channel's refusal
to accept paid advertisements from competitors for concert
promotion could indicate the intent to create a monopoly for
itself.TM He also concluded that there was a dispute of material
fact with regard to the tying claim that Clear Channel conditioned
airplay of55 artists' songs to their use of Clear Channel as a
promoter.1
Nottingham closed the opinion by stating that the result
compelled a trial on the issue of anticompetitive conduct for the
claim of attempted monopolization. 6 Unfortunately, NIPP never
reached trial because the two companies settled in June 2004
under undisclosed terms."7
Judge Nottingham's opinion
addressed," 8 but did not primarily concern, consumer welfare.
Instead, he spent considerable time examining conduct that may

consistent pricing below cost is not financially beneficial, and it has the
"predatory purpose" of excluding the competition from market participation or
even causing bankruptcy (without business justification) and should be
considered specific intent for purposes of attempted monopolization.
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 40. NIPP maintained that Clear
Channel engaged in the "specific intent" to monopolize with regard to a Styx,
Bad Company concert promoted by House of Blues. Nobody In Particular
Presents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. House of Blues chose a station owned by
Tribune Broadcasting to promote the concert, and Clear Channel sent internal
messages discouraging Clear Channel radio stations from accepting any
additional advertising, for the event with the purpose of encouraging failure.
Id. One e-mail from Mike O'Connor, Clear Channel's director of FM
programming to the Denver read: "Let's crush the [Tribune station] and HOB
on this show ...

hope you will tow the line ...

do not give free impressions to

this Hawk festival on any of your stations.., avoid accepting advertising...
let's get our f*cksticks out." Id.
152. Nobody in ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
153. Id. One hypothetical example of anticompetitive conduct that has no
reasonable business justification would be that of a railroad company who
owns the only bridge across a river. If the railroad company denies use of that
bridge to a "desperate" competitor, it will eventually drive the competitor out
of business leaving the railroad in possession of a monopoly. SHENEFIELD &
STELZER, supra note 73, at 40.
154. Nobody In ParticularPresents,311 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
155. Id. at 1108.
156. Id. at 1109.
157. NIPP Settles with Clear Channel, DENVER BUS. J., June 2, 2004,
http://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2004/05/31/daily2O.html.
Clear
Channel admitted no wrongdoing in the settlement. Id.
158. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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injure producers as a whole, ultimately breaking down free
competitive enterprise."
C. JamSports: The Seventh Circuit Interprets the Sherman Act in
Terms of Consumer Welfare and Compels a Similar Result
In a summary judgment proceeding, Clear Channel raised
two arguments as to why JamSports would not be able to succeed
on its antitrust claims.6
First, Clear Channel claimed that
JamSports
was unable
to
show
that Clear Channel's
anticompetitive conduct was the cause of consumer injury, the
16 1
type of damage that the Sherman Act intended to combat.
Second, the company argued that it was entitled to summary
judgment because JamSports could not prove that Clear Channel's
conduct was anticompetitive in terms of a monopolization claim
under § 2 of the Sherman Act. 62 The court found that there was
adequate evidence to prove economic inefficiency resulting in
potential injury to the consumer and sent the matter to trial.'63
1.

The Debate Over Antitrust Injury

Clear Channel argued that in order to show antitrust injury,
the plaintiff must illustrate harm to consumers either through
decreased output or an increase in prices."
The company
continued to argue that JamSports was unable to do so because

159. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 12 (stating that
preventing the accumulation of monopoly power contributes to consumer
welfare because it inhibits "price gouging," but it also meets the "socio-political
objective of dispersing economic power").
160. JamSportsI, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
161. Id. The purpose of proving antitrust injury is to ensure that the harm
corresponds with the reason for finding a violation of the antitrust laws to
begin with: namely, proof that anticompetitive conduct injures competition,
not individual competitors. Id. In fact the Seventh Circuit has "stressed that
antitrust [law] is designed to protect consumers from producers, not to protect
producers from each other .... " Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 90 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir. 1996).
162. JamSports I, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 832. JamSports alleged that Clear
Channel engaged in anticompetitive behavior with the intent to "lock up" or
prevent JamSports from using stadiums owned by Clear Channel for
supercross events. Id. at 833. Clear Channel maintained that the conduct
was not anticompetitive and had a legitimate business justification; however,
Clear Channel does not give any indication as to what that business purpose
could be. Id. at 843.
163. See id. at 852 (showing that the court denied Clear Channel's motion for
summary judgment on the Sherman Act claims and set the date for the filing
of the final pretrial order for November 15, 2004).
164. Id. at 833. Several Seventh Circuit opinions adopt this definition of
antitrust injury: Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992); U.S. Gypsum Co. v.
Indiana Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir 2003); Stamatakis Industries, Inc.
v. King, 965 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1992).
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the number of promoters of the AMA Supercross Series remained
unchanged."5 Ultimately, Clear Channel maintained, as a matter
of law, that no antitrust injury can be demonstrated when one
"natural" monopolist prevents another firm from replacing it as a
monopoly.'
The court recognized that the Seventh Circuit generally
follows the doctrine that establishing harm to consumers is the
crux of antitrust injury,'67 but it maintained that Clear Channel
did not make an accurate showing that JamSports was simply
trying to replace one monopolist with another." In fact, the court
found that JamSports's attempt to promote AMA supercross
events did not necessarily mean that Clear Channel was precluded
from promoting supercross events generally." 9
The opinion
reasons that a jury could have concluded that if both companies
sponsored competing series, there would have been increased
output, decreased prices, and an ultimate benefit to the
consumer. 7 0 It follows that Clear Channel's actions preventing
JamSports from fulfilling the contract for the supercross series

165. See JamSports 1, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (arguing that because Clear
Channel was the only promoter of the AMA sanctioned series, JamSports was
attempting to replace Clear Channel as the single promoter and regardless of
whoever won the contract, there would be no decrease in output because there
would be no difference to the consumer).
166. Id. at 834. Clear Channel relies on the holding of Brunswick Corp. v.
Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984), in which Judge Posner
did not find any "consumer interest" when a plaintiff accused a defendant of
fraudulently patenting antistatic yarn invented by the plaintiff, and enjoying
a patent-based monopoly to which the plaintiff felt entitled. Id. The court
concluded that "if no consumer interest can be discerned even remotely in a
suit brought by a competitor ... a victory for the competitor can confer no
benefit, certain or probable, present or future, on consumers." Id.
167. Id. But see Fishman, 807 F.2d at 535 (holding that a defendant's
attempt to acquire a natural monopoly was not precluded from examination
under the Sherman Act even absent a plaintiffs showing of consumer injury
because producer injury resulting from interference with the competitive
process is also worthy of antitrust enforcement). JamSports I continues by
suggesting that the key to antitrust legislation is to protect consumer wellbeing through "unfettered competition," and a concrete showing of public harm
may not be the lynchpin of the inquiry. 336 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (quoting
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 537-38). However the court finds no need to resolve the
issue and answers the question based on these circumstances, determining
that there is a potential for actual injury to the consumer. Id. at 837.
168. Id. at 836-37.
169. Id. JamSports's expert witness said that supercross may eventually
"resolve itself into a single series" but that does not preclude the possibility
that competition may occur. Id. at 836 n.2.
170. Id. at 836-37. Even if the market was only able to sustain competition
for a short period of time before it collapsed into one series, there would still
be increased output during that time. Id. at 836 n. 2 .
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harmed the competitive process and may be indicative of antitrust
injury in the form of decreased output or increased prices." 1
2. Arguing the Anticompetitive Nature of Clear Channel's
Conduct

As key examples

of anticompetitive

conduct, JamSports

presented evidence that Clear Channel threatened to withdraw all
of its events from certain stadiums if those stadiums persisted in
Clear Channel
booking the JamSports AMA supercross events.'
is not an element of a
maintained that because "intent"'
claim, its "desire for JamSports to be regarded as
monopolization
'poison"'174 cannot be a basis of liability for anticompetitive
The company insisted that regardless of intent, it had a
conduct.'
relevant business justification for seeking "protection periods"
competitive process and should not be
other than to stifle the
76

subject to § 2 scrutiny.

The court dismissed Clear Channel's insistence that intent is
irrelevant, and instead found that it is pertinent to determining if
conduct is exclusionary or anticompetitive.' 77 The court held that a
jury might find that Clear Channel had a legitimate business
purpose for its conduct, but that JamSports raised a genuine issue
as to whether Clear Channel engaged in "conduct aimed solely at
171. Id. at 837.
172. Id. at 843. The president of Clear Channel's motor sports division,
Charlie Mancuso, e-mailed the company's vice-president of booking motor
events, Eric Cole, indicating that they needed to "lock up" those key stadiums
used for supercross events for at least the next three years, thus attempting to
prevent JamSports from booking in supercross friendly stadiums. Id. at 84344. Mancuso instructed Cole to have the venues sign "protection clauses" in
which the venue would guarantee that it "would not host other motor sports
events within a certain number of days or months of Clear Channel's events."
Id. at 844. After being informed that JamSports was inquiring about booking
supercross dates at the Astrodome and Reliant Field, Cole reminded the
general manager of the venues that "we have been producing motor sports s
[sic] events in that facility for 30 years" and it was "unacceptable" for the
facility to book a JamSports race. Id.
173. "The intent to achieve... a monopoly is no more unlawful than the
possession of a monopoly." Id. at 843 (quoting Ill. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line
Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481 (7th Cir. 1981)).
174. Id. at 842.
175. Id. Clear Channel relies on Seventh Circuit holdings that "if conduct is
not objectively anticompetitive[,] the fact that it was motivated by hostility to
competitors... is irrelevant." Id. (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986)).
176. Id. at 843, 845.
177. Id. at 842. The opinion quotes Learned Hand, who stated that "no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing" and ultimately
concluded that the level of intent necessary for a § 2 Sherman Act claim is the
"intent to maintain or achieve monopoly power by anticompetitive means." Id.
at 843 (quoting Illinois v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481
(7th Cir. 1981)).
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hindering competition." 178 Conduct intended to allow a firm to
compete more effectively is permissible while actions designed to
insulate a company from competitive pressure are decidedly
9
anticompetitive.Y1
Once again, the court indicated that the jury
would have to look at Clear Channel's behavior in terms of
economic efficiency. If there was justification for its behavior,
Clear Channel should not be found to be in violation of the
Sherman Act. 8 °

III. CONSUMERS ARE SUFFERING FROM MORE THAN
JUST HIGH PRICES

To date, no court has issued a clear disposition on the
question of Clear Channel/Live Nation's alleged anticompetitive
conduct in concert promotion as applied to the antitrust laws.
There is indication that the federal court system finds the nature
of Clear Channel's behavior to be a sufficient question of fact,
8
worthy of jury determination on its anticompetitivenessY
In addition to the economic impact on the price of concert
tickets, consumers suffer the effect of various non-economic factors
that ultimately deny them meaningful choice when deciding to
attend events. The regional approach to concert promotion has
largely disappeared and consumers are left paying high prices for
streamlined events that may not cater to the local fan base.
However, in terms of the Sherman Act, these consumers may have
the unique ability to bring about change through class action
lawsuits. These class actions can concretely address the concept of
178. Id.; see also id. at 845 (stating that a reasonable jury could make the
determination that Clear Channel, by virtue of its market power, pressured
venues and stadiums not to host competing motor sporting events "with the
sole intent of restraining the competitive process").
179. Id.
180. See JamSports & Entm't, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. (JamSportsII),
382 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (reporting that a jury returned a
verdict in favor of Clear Channel for JamSports's claims of Sherman Act
violations). The opinion gives no reasoning behind the jury decision but
indicates that the jury found in favor of the JamSports for its tortious
interference with contract claim. Id. The federal jury awarded JamSports a
$90 million verdict. Geoff Dougherty, Jam Wins Racing Case Against Clear
Channel, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2005, § 2, at 1. The verdict was eventually
overturned on appeal, but Clear Channel reportedly paid JamSports a
significant settlement before JamSports could bring the case back to court.
DeRogatis, supra note 14, at D6.
181. See generally JamSports I, 336 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(providing an example of a federal judge denying summary judgment in favor
of Clear Channel on the Sherman Act claim in favor of empaneling a jury to
determine whether the evidence JamSports presented would qualify as
anticompetitive conduct). See also Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F.
Supp. 2d at 1048 (denying Clear Channel's motion for summary judgment in
favor of NIPP's ability to present competent evidence that could allow a jury to
find that Clear Channel was guilty of attempted monopolization).
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consumer injury that is lacking in the promoter suits, perhaps
with a level of success.
A.

Non-Economic FactorsAffecting Concert Fans

The court in JamSportsIwould not commit to the notion that
consumer injury is the "sine qua non" of antitrust injury, 182 and
Judge Nottingham in Nobody ParticularPresents was reluctant to
find that only an injury to the consumer constituted antitrust
injury. 83 However, there is no doubt that the consumer is indeed
suffering as a result of Clear Channel/Live Nation's expansive
control over the live concert industry. In addition to the classic
economic injury resulting from higher concert tickets," the public
also endures a variety of intangible wounds that antitrust
legislation may address. 8 Economic efficiency may be where the
inquiry begins, but it is certainly not where it ends."
First, concentrating concert promotion in the hands of one
promoter denies the consumer choice. 8 Fans have no freedom to
M

182. See JamSports 1, 336 F. Supp 2d at 836 (stating that the Seventh
Circuit is split on the concept: some cases hold that reduction in output or a
raise in prices directly affecting the customer constitutes antitrust injury with
other cases holding that the application of the antitrust laws does not rest on
the demonstration of consumer injury).
183. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (demonstrating
Nottingham's opinion that antitrust injury under the laws is not limited to
consumer injury but also injury to the competitive process via damage to the
tools of competition).
184. See Bill Wyman, Fleece Your Children, SALON, Apr. 12, 2000,
http://archive.salon.com/ent/log/2000/04/12/csny-tix/index.html
(noting that
the overall gross revenues from the top fifty tours in the United States
increased 30% from 1999 to 2000 and could be attributed to SFX taking over a
large chunk of the concert industry and "energetically mov[ing] to exploit as
much of the ... economic value as possible of the concerts it promotes").
185. These intangible non-economic effects of Clear Channel's alleged
anticompetitive conduct are much akin to the socio-political arguments in
favor of antitrust enforcement to advance the dispersal of economic power and
favor the "role of individual entrepreneurs." SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra
note 73, at 12; see also Cassie Connor, Clear Channel: The Microsoft of Music,
http://www.openingbands.com/features)?forceissue=2002-03-15#1 (last visited
Apr. 28, 2008) (recognizing that America's economic history is rooted in
"entrepreneurship and corporations, but the American people depend on
responsible corporations in order to maintain a decent quality of life ... [and]
Clear Channel is not filling this role of a responsible corporation").
186. See DeRogatis, supra note 14, at D6 (quoting JamSports's Jerry
Mickelson, "As the concert business gets smaller and smaller, the consumer is
hurt more and more[;] [tihe fewer choices we have, the worse it is in any
segment of our lives").
187. See Connor, supra note 184 (quoting a consumer complaining about the
homogenization of the concert industry, "[Clear Channel] will buy up the
major venues in a town then hold concerts in their venues, sponsored by their
radio stations, booked by their employees, and only featuring bands that are
friendly to Clear Channel").
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participate in independent concert communities that local
promoters foster and cater to with customized concert
experiences." Instead, concertgoers nationwide are subject to the
same uniform experience, developed by one core group of
producers working for Clear Channel.
Second, in addition to experiencing a marked rise in ticket
prices,189 some of the entrance fees are so high that fans are unable
to attend. 9 ' Those consumers are effectively disenfranchised from
the experience,19 ' and must be content to stay home and listen to
their favorite artists on the radio. 92
Third, consumers will never be exposed to independent artists
over the radio waves by virtue of Clear Channel's stranglehold on
the broadcast industry.9 3 Artists need radio airplay in order to
188. See id. (stating that the Clear Channel business plan eventually puts
local concert promoters out of business, and this is not only harmful to the
competitor, but to the public as well). The author states that Clear Channel
will often ignore local bands for promotion, thus preventing the public from
hearing diverse product. Id. Connor also indicates that the public suffers
because it no longer sees concerts produced by regional companies that are in
tune with the unique proclivities of a local market, but rather concerts
assembled "hundreds of miles away" that are generic and mainstreamed. Id.
189. See Jake McGee, Live Nation is a Minion of Evil, KOTORI MAG., Dec. 1,
2006, available at http://www.getunderground.com/underground/features/
article.cfm?ArticleID=2042 (citing Pollstarstatistics stating that the number
of concert tickets dropped by one million between 2004 and 2005 while the
revenue for concert tickets rose from $2.8 billion in 2004 to $3.1 billion in
2005).
190. Jennifer Duffield of Waterford, Michigan told Paul Egan of the Detroit
News that she used to attend concerts "casually, checking out what performers
were in town in much the same way people check out movie listings." Egan,
supra note 44, at 1A. Today fewer teenagers are attending concerts and she
states that she could not attend "nearly as many concerts if she was a student
today." Id. Not only have the face values of tickets risen, the increase in the
number of "add-on" convenience fees are "spin[ing] out of control," most of
which end up in the pockets of Ticketmaster and Clear Channel
Entertainment. Eric Boehlert, What's Wrong With the Music Biz?, SALON,
July 19, 2001, http://archive.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/07/19/industry
_downturn/index.html.
191. See McGee, supra note 189 (likening the modem Clear Channel concert
experience to "expensive yuppie galas where lattes are sold at punk rock
shows"). The "golden circle" pricing standard has become the norm in the rock
concert industry where prime seats were originally sold at higher prices.
Wyman, supra note 184. Eventually the "golden circle" expanded to comprise
a hefty chunk of any venue. Id.; see also, Egan, supra note 44, at 1A (quoting
Owen Sloane, a Southern California lawyer who includes Elton John, Kenny
Rogers and Bonnie Raitt amongst his clients, "I think most people in the
business feel that the prices are too high and you're basically cutting out a lot
of people").
192. Chances are the fan will be listening to a Clear Channel Radio Station.
Today, Clear Channel owns about 1,200 stations, 10% of all radio station in
this country. Connor, supra note 184.
193. See Spencer, supra note 52 (indicating that Clear Channel owns only
eleven percent of commercial radio stations, hardly a monopoly but in the
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gain exposure and sell a number of concert tickets, while concert
promoters need radio advertising to make sure those same tickets
are sold.194 Clear Channel is known to leverage its playlists to
make sure its concert promotion division lands certain tours,
wrestling them from the competition.9 Thus, if Clear Channel is
creating cookie cutter playlists, featuring only artists who will
yield the most lucrative live tour, lesser known bands are left with
fewer places to showcase their sound and independent promoters
cannot afford to take a96 chance on a tour because the public is not
familiar with the Act.1
B. Consumer Power to Effectuate Change
While producer antitrust lawsuits have garnered the intrigue
of the court, perhaps the most effective way to illustrate antitrust
injury (so as to avoid the necessity of a debate over what
constitutes actual injury) would be to present it from the
A lawsuit claiming
perspective of the concert attendee. 97
consumer injury and illustrating that such injury is the necessary
effect of anticompetitive conduct would eliminate the hurdles that
courts face in producer suits, where they attempt to reject the
notion that consumer injury is necessary to illustrate an antitrust
injury.'9 By presenting definitive consumer injury, both economic
and socio-political, the debate becomes moot, and producers
concerns about the breakdown of the competitive process will still
be addressed because consumer injury flows from the same
collapse.9'

particular industry it is certainly a "hegemony" as the largest radio group of
any by far).

194. Boehlert, supra note 50.
195. Eric Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, SALON, Apr. 30, 2001, http://archive
.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/04/30/clearchannel/index.html.

196. See Schapiro, supra note 41 (indicating that the rock 'n' roll industry
thrived on the creative triumvirate that existed between radio programmers,
concert promoters and artists and now that entire dynamic iscentralized with
successful bands continually being offered a lot of money for concert tours
while unknown groups are at a loss).
197. Section 4 of the Clayton Act creates a private right of action for "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1997).
198. See JamSports I, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (holding that consumer injury
is not necessary to show antitrust injury).
199. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 73, at 13 (stating that Adam
Smith's idea that the "invisible hand" of competition should drive the economy
creating the most efficient use of resources, stimulating technological
innovations, mandating that companies produce high quality product for low
prices in quantities that consumers need all add up to "consumer welfare").
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C. The Need for Class Action
The two antitrust suits brought by producers against Clear
Channel/Live
Nation
both
reached
resolution
through
settlement."' Perhaps Clear Channel's pockets are so deep that
settlement is always a viable solution, or maybe producers accept
settlements so that they can continue to operate as concert
promoters, rather than becoming mired in time- consuming
litigation. No court has been able to issue a final word on Clear
Channel's activities because of the prevalence of settlement with
regard to such matters.
Individual concert fans do not necessarily have the financial
resources or damage interest to bring an antitrust suit in federal
court against a large corporation such as Clear Channel
Communications." 1 A class action provides an ideal mechanism
for potential plaintiffs to bring claims while promoting judicial
economy."'
The class action would allow a single
plaintiff/consumer to file one complaint on behalf of an entire class
of individuals with the resolution binding on all members. °2 Not
only is the class action an efficient tool of litigation, it would
prompt a definitive answer to the question of whether Clear
Channel engages in anticompetitive or exclusionary practices in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
D. Heerwagen: The ClassAction Pioneer
In June of 2002, Melinda Heerwagen of Chicago filed a class
action suit against Clear Channel on behalf of individuals who
purchased tickets to any live rock concert produced by Clear
Channel since 1997. °4 She alleged sharp increases in ticket prices
that were unrelated to inflation and a direct result of Clear
Channel's "unlawful and anticompetitive" practices, constituting
monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act. 20 Namely, she asserted that Clear Channel's
200. See supra notes 157 and 179 and accompanying text.
201. See MARGARET C. JASPER, YOUR RIGHTS IN A CLASS ACTION SUIT 2

(Oceana Publications, Inc. 2005) (indicating that in many cases the damages
suffered by the individual are too small to justify hiring a lawyer to bring suit,

thus allowing suspect business practices to go unchecked).

It is also not

economically feasible for any lawyer to undertake a lawsuit against a large

company who has violated an individual's rights. Id. at vii.

202. See id. at 2 (illustrating that if each individual plaintiff filed a separate
complaint alleging the virtually identical allegations it would be a waste of
judicial resources, and there would be a risk of varying outcomes for
"essentially the same claim").

203. Id.
204. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir.

2006)
205. Id. at 223-24. Ms. Heerwagen presented evidence through her expert,

Princeton University Economics Professor Alan B. Krueger, that the ticket
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dominance in the radio market directly related to the creation of
monopolistic pricing for concert tickets.0 6
The court denied
certification of a national class,2°7 determining that the relevant
market was local in nature because there is no cross-elasticity of
demand for live concert tickets between geographic areas
nationally."8
In order to pass class certification to proceed on the issue of
Clear Channel's alleged violation of the antitrust laws, the class
itself must be redefined. The most effective way to define the class
locally while still attracting greater numbers of plaintiffs and
implicating interstate commerce for purposes of § 2 of the
Sherman Act is to create a regional profile that crosses state lines
but does not purport to be national.0 9
E. Redefining the Class
On June 3, 2006, Daniel Woodring, a rock music fan from
Cincinnati filed a federal antitrust suit against Clear Channel,210
prices rose 21% from 1991 to 1996, while the Consumer Price Index showed
that overall prices only rose 15%. Id. at 223. In fact, according to Professor
Krueger, during that period, the price of concert tickets rose more than tickets
to other events including movies, theatrical performances and sporting events.
Id.
206. Id. at 224. She claimed that Clear Channel excluded competitors from
the concert promotion market, putting pressure on artists to steer away from
independent promoters by limiting competitors access to advertising on Clear
Channel radio stations, charging excessive advertising rates, misrepresenting
the availability of advertising and neglecting to include competitors in
"miscellaneous promotions such as ticket giveaway contests." Id.
207. Id. at 225. The appellate court reviewed the district court's decision
failing to certify the class for an abuse of discretion. Id. Ultimately, the court
renewed the lower court's finding that the "plaintiff is... not an adequate or
typical representative of a class of ticket purchasers beyond those in plaintiffs
local market." Id. at 226.
208. Id. at 228. The court reasoned that a purchaser of rock concert tickets
is not likely to travel out of his/her own geographic region to purchase tickets
even if the price is lower than in his/her own region. Id. Though not within
the scope of this comment, one may argue that there is a class of concert ticket
purchasers who definitely would qualify as a national class by virtue of the
fact that they frequently travel outside of their geographic region in order to
attend concerts all over the country. Super-fans who follow the likes of the
Grateful Dead, Widespread Panic, or even Jimmy Buffett are known for
traveling far and wide to catch as many shows of a national tour as possible.
209. See Sloat, supra note 44, at C1 (stating that there are defined "concert
booking" markets that affect how anti-monopoly laws are litigated in federal
courts).
210. Concert Fan Sues Clear Channel, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jun. 4,
2006, at b3. The lawsuit alleges that Clear Channel limited radio airplay for
artists who did not use its promoter, refused advertising to competing
promoters, charged them excessive advertising rates or gave them undesirable
time slots. Id. In addition, the suit alleges that Clear Channel pays artists
fees in excess of contract demands to discourage competitors from getting
desirable tours allowing Clear Channel to recoup its costs via increased ticket
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seeking class action status for individuals who purchased tickets
to rock concerts in Kentucky, Indiana, and portions of Ohio since
1998.21 Class certification would cover millions of concertgoers
throughout the Midwest.2
Katherine Ludt, a Madison, Wisconsin resident, filed a
similar class action suit in federal court in 2006.1
The suit
alleged that Clear Channel's acquisition of dominance in rock
music radio curtailed competition in concert promotion and
boosted ticket prices by reducing radio airplay for artists refusing
to use Clear Channel's promotion services, charging excessive fees
or refusing advertising from competitors, and inflating fees paid to
artists in order to exclude competitors from the concert promotion
market.214
These two regional class actions are examples of more than a
dozen similar lawsuits that were pending across the country with
limited media attention."' In an effort to conserve the "costly and
time-consuming pre-certification steps that must be undertaken
before there is any guarantee that a class action can go forward,"2 1
the legal system eventually stepped in to consolidate the claims.
In 2005, one of these regional class action plaintiffs filed a
complaint in Southern California alleging that Clear Channel was
engaged in "anticompetitive activities to acquire, maintain, and
extend its monopoly power in various regional ticket markets for
live rock concerts.",, 7 The federal Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation ordered the transfer of similar and related actions that
were pending outside the California court.2 1 ' For purposes of
discovery, the court ordered that the scope would be limited to five

prices. Id.
211. See id. (indicating that residents of Northern Ohio are not included in
the class because they do not fall within the courts jurisdiction and reside in a
different booking market).
212. Id.
213. Kevin Murphy, Clear Channel Hit With Lawsuit, CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, WI.), June 3, 2006, at D12. The suit seeks class action status for all
persons who bought tickets to rock concerts promoted by Clear Channel
between June 13, 1998 and December 21, 2005, in Wisconsin, Chicago,
Michigan and Northeast Iowa. Id.
214. Id.
215. Sloat, supra note 44, at C1. Hollis L. Salzman, co-counsel on the Daniel
Woodring Case, stated that there are a number of consumers who may be
"interested in stepping forward soon" as the firm has received a number of
telephone calls about ticket prices around the country. Id.
216. JASPER, supra note 200, at 3.
217. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, No. 06-ML-1745-SVW(RCx),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82894, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2007).
218. Id. A total of twenty-one cases were transferred from outside the
Central District of California and each complaint was substantively identical.

Id.
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regions: Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, and New York/New
Jersey. 19
Following a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, the court held that the plaintiffs had fulfilled the
requirements of Federal Rule 23(a) and granted the motion to
certify the class. 220 The court favored the class action method as
the "superior method for adjudicating this controversy because
resolution of common questions of market definition, market
power, anticompetitive conduct and antitrust impact in these class
actions is more efficient than relitigating [them] on a case-by-case
basis thousands of times." 21 The court certified five different
classes that corresponded to the five different regions used for
purposes of discovery. 222
Judge Wilson noted specifically that he was not making or
indicating any opinion as to the merits of the antitrust litigation. 22 3
Certifying the class is only the first step. Showing that Clear
Channel/Live Nation has used its powers in the radio and
promotion industry to engage in anticompetitive conduct that
drove up ticket prices for live events will be a tedious process for
these plaintiffs. The future for these litigants involves extensive
discovery and will likely hinge on the battle between financial
experts. The litigants in Nobody In Particular Presents and
Heerwagen each presented the testimony of learned economic
specialists as to the presence or absence of the elements of
monopolization and attempted monopolization. 24 Similarly, these
parties will have to present evidence that defines the relevant
market and whether or not Clear Channel holds enough market
power to constitute a monopoly. Experts will also have to
characterize anticompetitive conduct and whether or not such
conduct would have a "dangerous probability of success." Not only
is the litigation likely to be drawn out, it will most certainly be

219. Id. at* 14-15.
220. Id. at *203. Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that a plaintiff seeking class certification show (1) that the number of class
members is so great that joinder of all of the parties would be impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law and fact that are common to all class members,
(3) the claims and defenses of the parties representing the class are typical of
the claims and defenses of the members of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will "fairly and adequately" protect the interests of the entire class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(A)(1-4).
221. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82894, at
203.
222. Id. at 204-05.
223. Id. at 202-03.
224. See generally Nobody In ParticularPresents, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048
(2004); Heerwagen, 435 F.3d 219 (2006). Interestingly enough, Malinda Riley
(nee Heerwagen) is one of the plaintiffs representing the Chicago class. In re
Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82894, at *204-05.
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costly.
Uniting as a class will make such dynamics more
manageable and certainly more efficient.
IV. CONCLUSION

Antitrust legislation is confusing in its purpose and is subject
to varying interpretation. Some believe its design purpose is to
maintain consumer welfare in purely economic terms while others
articulate that the Sherman Act and its progeny were enacted to
preserve diversity in the market and the endeavors of the "little
guy."
Another argument centers around what constitutes
antitrust injury: is it demonstrable injury to the consumer, or can
it include injury to the means of competition? The class action suit
brought by consumers against Clear ChannelfLive Nation would
address all of these concerns in turn.
The new proposed regional class action would satisfy the
economic efficiency experts because the suit would provide
evidence of an increase in ticket prices and anticompetitive
conduct that defies business justification. The class action would
also address other factors that are not immediately tangible.
There is an argument that lack of diversity in the concert
promotion industry is restricting consumers' access to lesserknown artists that possibly constitutes anticompetitive conduct
that would tickle the fancy of staunch protectionists.
The
dramatic increase in rock concert ticket prices provides direct
proof of consumer injury. Even injury to the means of production
has secondary effects on the consumer because he/she lacks choice
due to constricted competition. The class action consumer suit
encompasses much more than the individual producer suit can on
its own. It also has the unique capacity to satisfy all parties
involved, with the exception of Clear Channel/Live Nation, of
course.
"Bill Graham was diametrically opposed to the synthetic
video world of MTV and kept his distance."22 He never could have
anticipated the likes of Clear Channel.

225. GLAT, supra note 5, at 235.

